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A B S T R A C T   
In electricity markets around the world, the substantial increase of intermittent renewable electricity generation 
has intensified concerns about generation adequacy, ultimately driving the implementation of capacity remu-
neration mechanisms. Although formally technology-neutral, substantial barriers often exist in these mechanisms 
for non-conventional capacity such as electricity storage. In this article, we provide a rigorous theoretical dis-
cussion on design parameters and show that the concrete design of a capacity remuneration mechanism always 
creates a bias towards one technology or the other. In particular, we can identify the bundling of capacity 
auctions with call options and the definition of the storage capacity credit as essential drivers affecting the future 
technology mix as well as generation adequacy. In order to illustrate and confirm our theoretical findings, we 
apply an agent-based electricity market model and run a number of simulations. Our results show that electricity 
storage has a capacity value and should therefore be allowed to participate in any capacity remuneration 
mechanism. Moreover, we find the implementation of a capacity remuneration mechanism with call options and 
a strike price to increase the competitiveness of storages against conventional power plants. However, deter-
mining the amount of firm capacity an electricity storage unit can provide remains a challenging task.   
1. Introduction 
The substantial increase of renewable electricity generation in 
countries around the world brings along new challenges for the appro-
priate design of electricity markets. Due to the highly intermittent na-
ture of solar and wind power, a certain amount of dispatchable capacity 
will likely also be required in the future, i.e., even under very high shares 
of renewables. At the same time, however, the reduced number of hours 
with scarcity and therefore price spikes leads to substantial risks for 
investments in this firm capacity. 
Driven by such considerations, so-called capacity remuneration 
mechanisms (CRMs) have been implemented in several regions of the 
world as an extension to the energy-only market (EOM), in which ca-
pacity providers are solely compensated for the amount of electricity 
they sell on the markets. In the US, the earliest such mechanisms date 
back to the late 1990s. In recent years, also several European countries 
have started implementing different kinds of CRMs (Bublitz et al., 2019). 
All of these mechanisms typically aim to reduce the risks for new in-
vestments by offering capacity providers supplementary income on top 
of the earnings from selling electricity on the market. The additional 
generation, storage or demand side management (DSM) capacity may 
then in turn help to improve generation adequacy, i.e., avoid shortage 
situations. 
Critical voices claim that CRMs are nothing but hidden subsidies to 
operators of conventional power plants while other alternative capacity 
providers, such as electricity storage or DSM, barely face any chance of 
successfully participating in these mechanisms. Formally, the European 
Commission requires full technology neutrality from any CRM to be 
implemented in Europe (European Commission, 2013). The situation is 
similar in the US, where the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has 
recently directed grid operators to remove barriers that hinder storage 
from participating in wholesale energy, capacity and ancillary services 
markets and to define rules for their efficient remuneration taking into 
account physical and operational characteristics of such units (Sakti 
et al., 2018). 
However, while most CRMs in Europe and the US generally allow the 
participation of storage and demand side units, the concrete rules 
applied differ substantially (Sakti et al., 2018; Usera et al., 2017). This is 
mostly due to the non-trivial question of whether and how much firm 
capacity such units can contribute to system adequacy. While conven-
tional power plants can provide full power output throughout scarcity 
periods of whatever length, storage units are not able to do so due to 
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their limited storage volume. The situation is similar for DSM, yet we 
exemplary focus on storage technologies in the remainder of this paper. 
The rules defined for storage participation in a given CRM have a 
strong impact on the competitiveness of these technologies. For 
example, in the PJM1 market area, storages are treated as conventional 
resources and therefore need to be available anytime PJM announces 
emergency conditions, no matter how long these situations may last 
(Chen et al., 2017; Usera et al., 2017). Consequently, storage operators 
need to fully manage the risk of their offers themselves and are subject to 
penalties if they fail to deliver their contracted capacity. Due to the 
energy-limited nature of electricity storage, this is a very rigorous 
requirement, basically excluding storages from participation in the 
CRM. Contrary, CAISO2 requires contracted capacity of its CRM to 
deliver their full output for at least four consecutive hours and to do so 
over three consecutive days (Usera et al., 2017). 
A different approach has been chosen in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, where methodologies to determine derating factors for stor-
age technologies based on adequacy metrics have recently been devel-
oped (National Grid, 2017; Single Electricity Market Committee, 2016; 
2018). These factors mostly depend on the individual storage volume of 
a given unit and are subject to future adjustments. Applying derating 
factors essentially aims to base the remuneration on the capacity credit 
of storages, i.e., these units are only remunerated for the amount of firm 
capacity they are able to provide rather than for their nameplate (or 
nominal) capacity. Such an approach is also suggested by Usera et al. 
(2017), as it may help electricity storage to compete in CRMs as 
compared to treating them in the same way as conventional resources. 
These examples show, that there still exists no consensus about the 
role of electricity storage in CRMs. While it is generally agreed that these 
technologies have some kind of capacity value, the specific rules of 
participation in CRMs may hinder them from being competitive against 
conventional resources. It is thus the objective of this paper, to delve into 
the question how the concrete design of a CRM may create a bias to-
wards or against storage technologies and thereby affect the future 
technology mix as well as long-term generation adequacy. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides an overview of the relevant literature and derives the research gap 
this paper aims to fill. In Section 3, a generic capacity auction mecha-
nism is first set up and a rigorous theoretical discussion is then provided, 
which highlights how bundling a CRM with call options3 and the choice 
of a storage derating factor may affect the competitiveness of storage 
units against conventional power plants. In order to illustrate and 
confirm the theoretical findings, a multi-period long-term electricity 
market model is applied and a number of simulations are run in Section 
4. Ultimately, Section 5 provides a summary of the findings, draws 
conclusions and derives relevant policy recommendations. 
2. Literature review and research gap 
In the following, an overview of existing literature relevant for this 
article is provided. Although the article sets an explicit focus on 
electricity storage, some literature on DSM is also reviewed due to strong 
analogies between these technologies. 
In a brief quantitative analysis, Schmitz et al. (2013) can show that 
excluding pumped storages from CRMs leads to a less efficient tech-
nology mix and ultimately welfare losses. The authors further provide a 
qualitative discussion on how the choice of CRM design parameters may 
create a bias against pumped storages. However, many of the parameters 
found to have an impact on pumped storages due to their capital cost 
intensity (contract duration, lag period, regional differentiation, market 
share) are much less relevant for novel storage technologies such as 
batteries. 
Mays et al. (2019) very recently provided first evidence that 
bundling CRMs with call options has an asymmetric effect on different 
generation technologies and creates a bias towards resources with lower 
fixed costs and higher operating costs, i.e., peaker units. They conclude 
that current market structures might not be suitable to finance 
low-carbon resources, which are characterised by high fixed costs and 
near-zero operating costs. However, the authors use a rather stylistic 
setup and do not consider electricity storage, but only conventional and 
renewable generation technologies. 
Another particularly relevant design parameter is the appropriate 
determination of so-called capacity credit metrics for storages. Different 
methods have been applied in this context, including approximations 
(Tuohy and O’Malley, 2009), dynamic programming (Sioshansi et al., 
2014) and iterative algorithms coupled with Monte Carlo experiments 
(Borozan et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2015, 2016). Yet, none of these con-
tributions looks into the role of the derived capacity credits in the 
context of a CRM. 
There exist, however, also a few studies investigating the in-
terdependencies between CRMs and electricity storage or DSM, which 
we present next. 
Lynch et al. (2019) set up a mixed complementary problem to model 
an electricity system with energy and reserve markets as well as a 
quantity-based capacity market. They use their model in a case study for 
Ireland and find that DSM has an inherent capacity value. The authors 
conclude that DSM should be eligible to participate in CRMs since 
welfare losses would occur otherwise. 
Opathella et al. (2019) introduce a capacity market model including 
a capacity demand curve as well as electrical storage and apply the 
developed model in a case study for Ontario. In doing so, they find 
derating factors to be a crucial factor deciding on the competitiveness of 
electricity storage. 
Teng and Strbac (2016) evaluate different multi-service business 
cases for bulk electricity storage. In doing so, the authors also rudi-
mentally consider storage participation in a CRM by reserving capacity 
during the peak periods and assuming a fixed capacity remuneration. 
They find that the restrictions due to the CRM only marginally reduce 
storage profits from the other markets and conclude that a CRM can 
contribute to a profitable business case for storages. 
Askeland et al. (2019) apply a linear complimentary model to 
analyze an EOM as well as a CRM in a European multi-country case 
study. The authors find that the CRM incentivizes substantial amounts of 
additional open cycle gas turbines, but also a little additional storage 
capacity as compared to the EOM. Moreover, they investigate the impact 
of different storage derating factors in the CRM and conclude that 
derating may lead to a substantial bias towards conventional power 
plants. 
Khan et al. (2018) apply a hybrid electricity market model which 
uses optimization for short-term market operations and agent-based 
simulation of long-term investment decisions. The model is used to 
investigate an isolated and uncongested electricity market, which either 
relies on a pure EOM or has an additional CRM implemented. For both of 
these market designs, different settings with or without electricity 
storage and DSM are analyzed. The business case for storages is found to 
be better in the EOM setting than under a CRM, as scarcity prices allow 
for a larger arbitrage profit in this setting. 
1 Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland Interconnection, a system operator in 
the US.  
2 California Independent System Operator.  
3 More precisely, real-world CRMs typically apply tolling agreements, which 
are a series of hourly call options with varying strike prices. However, given the 
non-availability of hourly resoluted projections up to 2050 in the literature, we 
assume constant fuel and carbon prices over the course of a year throughout 
this paper. In consequence, we also apply constant strike prices in a given future 
year. We therefore refer to call options rather than using the technically more 
correct term tolling agreements. This does however not diminish the validity of 
our results, but rather makes the analyses more concise. Please also note that 
while CRM typically have a long-term focus (i.e., multiple years), tolling 
agreements can also be used independently from a CRM and may then cover 
shorter time periods, e.g., one year. 
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In the context of the existing literature, the contribution of this paper 
is as follows. To start with, for the first time, a rigorous theoretical 
discussion is presented on why and how bundling a CRM with call op-
tions and the choice of a storage derating factor may affect the 
competitiveness of storage units against conventional power plants. 
Moreover, a multi-period long-term electricity market model is 
applied and a number of simulations are run to confirm the theoretical 
results. This contribution is therefore also the first in the literature to 
quantitatively analyze the impact of bundling a CRM and call options 
with a strike price on the competitiveness of storage units. Last but not 
least, our simulation approach differs from those presented in the 
literature to date in several important aspects. 
Firstly, we consider a region covering several interconnected Euro-
pean market areas. Like this, we are able to adequately take cross-border 
effects into account, an aspect that we regard essential in light of the 
ongoing strong increase in cross-border transmission capacity. In the 
existing literature, either only a single country is considered (Khan et al., 
2018; Lynch et al., 2019; Opathella et al., 2019; Teng and Strbac, 2016) 
or an unlimited interconnection capacity between the modeled coun-
tries is assumed (Askeland et al., 2019). 
Secondly, we model multiple investment decision, capacity auction 
and day-ahead market periods, which is important due to potential path 
dependencies and lock-in effects. Most of the literature only considers a 
single capacity auction period (Askeland et al., 2019; Lynch et al., 2019; 
Opathella et al., 2019; Teng and Strbac, 2016). Moreover, Opathella 
et al. (2019) and Teng and Strbac (2016) do not model endogenous 
investment decisions at all, while Askeland et al. (2019) use a greenfield 
approach instead of considering the existing generation fleets. 
Thirdly, electricity storage is fully integrated into the investment 
module of our model by determining its maximum future arbitrage 
potential and deriving expected future profits. Despite the computa-
tional burden of this approach, we consider it the only possibility to have 
a real trade-off between different investment options, i.e., conventional 
power plants and storages. In contrast, Khan et al. (2018) only very 
rudimentally implement storage investments by considering historical 
profits rather than expected future profits as for the conventional power 
plant technologies. This is not only a strong simplification but also an 
inconsistent approach. 
Fourthly, we also fully integrate electricity storage into the CRM 
module of our model by considering different storage derating strate-
gies. This is an essential aspect as the literature suggests that the 
nameplate capacity of storage is not identical with the amount of firm 
capacity that this technology can provide. In contrast, Khan et al. (2018) 
use the rather basic approach of having the storages bid their full 
nameplate capacity. 
We can conclude that the applied simulation approach allows for the 
consideration of dynamic aspects and interdependencies in terms of time 
(multiple decision periods), space (multiple interconnected countries), 
technologies (different conventional power plants and types of storage) 
and markets (EOM and CRM) with an explicit focus on the development 
of the future technology mix as well as long-term generation adequacy. 
To the best of our knowledge, such an approach is unique in the liter-
ature available to date and highly suitable to investigate the role of 
electricity storage in CRMs. 
3. Theoretical discussion on relevant design parameters 
In this section, a theoretical discussion on CRM design and its impact 
on the competitiveness of electricity storage against conventional power 
plants is presented. For this purpose, a generic CRM is first set up 
(Section 3.1) and it is then shown that bundling a CRM with call options 
and derating of storage capacity are essential drivers for the competi-
tiveness of storages. These two drivers are ultimately analyzed in more 
detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.1. Generic capacity auction mechanism 
CRMs are typically designed to maintain generation adequacy and 
ultimately avoid shortage situations by offering capacity providers in-
come on top of the earnings from selling electricity on energy markets. 
Although mechanisms may vary substantially in the way the required 
capacity and the corresponding capacity prices are determined, all types 
of CRMs should in theory lead to similar outcomes.4 Therefore, without 
loss of generality, we assume a so-called central buyer mechanism with 
reliability options in the following. Such mechanisms are currently used 
by the US system operator ISO-NE5 (Byers et al., 2018) as well as in Italy 
(Mastropietro et al., 2018; Perico et al., 2018) and Ireland (Single 
Electricity Market Committee, 2015). In a central buyer mechanism, a 
regulator first determines the total amount of firm capacity to be pro-
cured in a centralized auction and other auction parameters. All suc-
cessful participants of the auction are then rewarded with the marginal 
capacity price of the auction. 
In order to ensure that sufficient capacity is actually available when 
needed, the regulator may impose capacity derating factors fderate in the 
auction, e.g., based on historical availability data or technology-specific 
considerations. We assume in the following that storage units are 
generally eligible to participate in the capacity auction, however need to 
be able to provide firm capacity over a predefined discharge duration.6 
Vazquez et al. (2002) propose combining the capacity auctions with 
financial call options, so-called reliability options. In exchange for the 
earnings through the fixed capacity remuneration provided in the auc-
tions, the earnings from the energy markets are then reduced by setting a 
price cap plimit on the market prices. If the electricity price rises above 
the price cap, the so-called strike price of the call option, the generators 
will have to return the peak energy rent, which is the difference between 
market price and strike price, to the regulator. Like this, electricity 
consumers are protected from unreasonably high prices while at the 
same time the capacity remuneration provides a more secure income to 
the generators which no longer have to rely on infrequently occurring 
price spikes. Typically, capacity providers will have to return the peak 
energy rent to the regulator anytime there is a positive difference be-
tween market price and strike price, regardless of whether they were 
able to produce in the given period or not. This reflects an implicit 
penalty for non-availability during scarcity periods, which is particu-
larly crucial for electricity storage. 
Imagine a multi-hour scarcity period with high market prices well 
above the strike price. Contrary to conventional power plants, storage 
units may then not be able to produce during the whole peak period, 
simply due to their limited energy content and consequently the storage 
running empty. Storage units may be exempt from the implicit penalty in 
such situations, as long as they were successfully providing their con-
tracted capacity for the required discharge duration predefined by the 
regulator. This option implies that the risk of adequately derating stor-
age capacity lies with the regulator. Alternatively, storage units may 
remain subject to the implicit penalty, even if their non-availability is 
caused by the storage running empty. Quite obviously, this latter option 
leaves a huge risk with the storage operators, basically excluding them 
from participation in the capacity auctions. This approach therefore 
4 For a detailed overview of different types of CRMs and their typical char-
acteristics, please refer to Bublitz et al. (2019). Please note that apart from 
CRMs other instruments exist to address the missing money problem, e.g., tolling 
agreements. The expected payoff of a one-year tolling agreement is then com-
parable to the capacity price of a CRM, both of which describe a revenue per 
capacity unit and year.  
5 Independent System Operator New England.  
6 Although a typical design parameter, we refrain from considering an explicit 
penalty for non-availability during scarcity periods, since electricity prices 
typically rise substantially in such situations and thus, there exists already a 
strong incentive to be available. 
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seems not reasonable, if technology neutrality is to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, when looking at the impact of call options in more detail 
(Section 3.2), we consider both variants. 
Let us further define that generators receive the remuneration of the 
capacity auction for a fixed amount of years nCRM. Under the described 
assumptions, we can now derive bidding strategies of an economically 
rational generator for a new generation or storage unit p. For this pur-
pose, the so-called difference costs DCp need to be computed, which 
describe the delta between the income needed for an investment to reach 
profitability and the net present value if the unit was optimally operated 
on the electricity market. This relation is shown in Eq. (1). Please note 
that the difference costs are only positive in case of negative net present 
values, while for investments already profitable without additional ca-
pacity remuneration, it is rational to bid into the capacity auction at zero 
cost to maximize the chances of being contracted and receiving addi-
tional capacity remuneration. 
The calculation of the specific net present value for a new generation 
or storage unit p is shown in Eq. (2), where cinvestp denotes the total in-
vestment expenses, δp the construction time in years, cfixp the fixed ex-
penditures for operation and maintenance per year, i the discount rate, 
np the investment horizon in years and CM(plimit)p,y the annual contri-
bution margins on the electricity market. Please note that the contri-
bution margins depend crucially on the level of the strike price plimit of 
the call option, as will be discussed in Section 3.2. Eq. (3) shows how the 
difference costs relate to the rational capacity bid price pCRMp for a unit p. 
Inserting Eqs. (2) and (3) into Eq. (1) and solving for pCRMp , we ultimately 
obtain the rational capacity bid price for investment option p as shown 

















































We now apply a few additional simplifications to bring Eq. (4) into a 
more concise form. 
(1) The contribution margins only depend on the respective tech-
nology and an option strike price, but are otherwise constant 
through all years under investigation – see Eq. (5a). 
(2) The fixed costs are set as a percentage k0 of the investment ex-
penses – see Eq. (5b).  
(3) Construction time and investment horizon are identical for all 
technologies – see Eqs. (5c) and (5d). 
(4) Two additional constants k1 and k2 are defined, which are inde-
pendent of the technology as long as assumption (3) holds – see 
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Applying the simplifications of Eqs. (5a)–(5f) to Eq. (4) finally leads 













We can now see from Eq. (6) that the relation of investment expenses 
cinvestp , contribution margins CM(plimit)p and derating factor fderatep decides 
which technology option is able to bid the lowest capacity price pCRM. To 
be more precise, there are essentially only these three drivers, on which 
ultimately the capacity auction outcome and in particular the resulting 
technology mix in the electricity market depends. 
The investment expenses cinvestp primarily depend on the specific 
technology p and cannot be directly influenced by the regulator of the 
capacity auction. However, particularly for emerging technologies, 
technological learning is likely to lead to substantial cost reductions in 
the future. For this reason, the simulation studies carried out later in this 
paper use dynamic investment expenses for all storage technologies. 
Although the achievable contribution margins CM(plimit)p largely 
depend on the respective technology, they can also be directly influ-
enced by the regulator by implementing call options with a certain strike 
price on the electricity market. We will discuss the impact of this design 
parameter in more detail in Section 3.2. 
The derating factors fderatep are technology-specific and particularly 
relevant for storage technologies. This parameter can be directly set by 
the regulator. More theoretical details on this design choice are pre-
sented in Section 3.3. 
3.2. Impact of a combination with call options 
Fig. 1 presents a stylized example of the day-ahead market in the 
future. In the first period t0,…,t1, high feed-in of renewables results in a 
low price plow, while in the subsequent second period t1,…,t2, low feed- 
in from renewables and a lack of capacity leads to scarcity and high 
prices phigh. This is a situation as it may frequently occur in the future 
under ongoing strong expansion of renewables. For the described 
setting, Table 1 summarizes the contribution margins that a conven-
tional power plant and a storage unit could make in different cases with 
and without a strike price. 
A conventional power plant with total variable costs cvar would only 
Fig. 1. Stylized example of the day-ahead market in the future with a low price 
period followed by a high price period. 
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operate when the market price p(t) exceeds its variable costs, i.e., in the 
period t1,…, t2. The corresponding specific contribution margins of the 
power plant if no strike price is set (Case 1) and if a strike price is set 
(Cases 2a and 2b) can be calculated using Table 1 and are shown in Eq. 





phigh − cvar, for Case 1
plimit − cvar, for Cases 2a/b (7) 
A storage unit with round-trip efficiency ηstor could use the low prices 
in the period t0,…, t1 to charge up to the maximum storage level and 
then discharge in the subsequent high price period t1,…, t*2. Please note 
that due to the limited storage volume as well as conversion losses, the 
unit can only sell electricity in a certain share of the high price period.7 
The maximum revenues of the storage unit are therefore lower than 
those of the conventional power plant. 
The specific contribution margins of the storage if no strike price is 
set (Case 1) and if a strike price is set (Cases 2a and 2b) can again be 
calculated using Table 1 and are shown in Eq. (8), where Δt = t2 − t1 =
t1 − t0. Please note, that, in case reliability options with a strike price are 
implemented, the margin depends on whether the storage operator 
(Case 2a) or the regulator (Case 2b) bears the risk of the storage running 
empty in a multi-hour scarcity period. In Case 2a, the storage operator 
would have to pay the difference between market price and strike price 
to the regulator during its non-availability in the period t*2,…, t2. Using 
Δt** = t2 − t2* = Δt(1 − ηstor), this is essentially an implicit penalty of 
pen = Δt(1 − ηstor)(phigh − plimit), corresponding to area C in Fig. 1. 
Contrary, in Case 2b, the storage operator is exempt from the implicit 







ηstorphigh − plow, for Case 1
plimit − plow − phigh(1 − ηstor), for Case 2a
ηstorplimit − plow, for Case 2b
(8) 
Whether a conventional power plant or a storage unit is better off in 
the given situation thus depends on different factors: the party bearing 
the risk of an empty storage, the absolute levels of plow, phigh, cvar and plimit 
(if applicable) as well as the storage volume smax and round-trip effi-
ciency ηstor. In systems with high shares of renewable electricity gener-
ation, it is reasonable to assume a lower price of plow = 0 EUR/MWhel. 
Eqs. (7) and (8) ultimately lead us to Eq. (9), which shows the con-
dition that needs to hold for the storage unit to gain a competitive 
advantage other the conventional power plant in the different cases. We 
can see that the condition for Cases 1 and 2a is identical and indepen-
dent of the strike price level plimit. Therefore, if the storage operator itself 
has to bear the risk of an empty storage and is then subject to an implicit 
penalty, the introduction of a strike price does not lead to a discrimi-
nation of any technology. However, setting phigh to the typical European 
day-ahead price limit of 3000EUR/MWhel and using a rather ambitious 
storage round-trip efficiency of ηstor = 90 %, we can derive that a stor-
age unit would only be better off under very high variable costs of the 
conventional power plant cvar > 300 EUR/MWhel (in this specific 
setting). This is a rather unrealistically high value from today’s 
perspective, but may well become true in the future, if carbon emission 
allowances reach a sufficiently high price level. 
CMstor > CMconv ⇔
{
phigh(1 − ηstor) < cvarCONE, for Cases 1/2a
plimit(1 − ηstor) < cvarCONE, for Case 2b
(9) 
If, however, a strike price is introduced and the regulator bears the 
risk of the storage running empty (Case 2b), the condition for the storage 
unit to be better off than the conventional power plant becomes 
dependent on the strike price level plimit. Consequently, in this setting, 
storage units would benefit from the introduction of reliability options 
with a certain strike price. If the strike price is set equal to the variable 
costs of a new conventional power plant, i.e., plimit = cvarCONE, the contri-
bution margin of storage units would always be at least equal, but likely 
higher, than that of conventional power plant. 
As previously mentioned, leaving the risk of a storage running empty 
during a long scarcity period with the storage operator, would basically 
exclude this technology from participation in the capacity auctions. In 
the remainder of this paper, and in particular for the simulations carried 
out in Section 4, we therefore assume, that the regulator bears this risk 
and the storage operators are exempt from the implicit penalty. 
3.3. The role of storage derating 
A relatively simple way of determining derating factors for storage 
technologies is the definition of a minimum discharge duration 
requirement by the regulator. Using this approach, also storage units 
with a small storage volume can participate in the capacity auctions, yet 
are only remunerated for a certain share of their capacity. The relation 
between derating factor fderatep for technology p, achievable discharge 
duration tdischargep at full capacity cmaxp and required discharge duration 
trequired is shown in Eq. (10). The achievable discharge duration can also 
be expressed using storage volume smaxp , maximum discharge capacity 
cmaxp and discharge efficiency η
discharge
p . Please note that the derating 
factor is limited to 1, since large storage volumes might otherwise lead 















Fig. 2 illustrates the impact of varying the storage duration re-
quirements trequired in a capacity auction. For this purpose, three 
Table 1 
Contribution margin of a conventional power plant and storage unit in the 
stylized example with a low price period followed by a high price period (cf. 
Fig. 1).  
Case Strike price Risk of empty storage Power plant Storage unit 
1 No Regulator B+ C+ D+ E  B+ D+ F − A  
2a Yes Storage operator D+ E  D+ F − A − C  
2b Yes Regulator D+ E  D+ F − A   
Fig. 2. Impact of different storage duration requirements on the difference 
costs of a conventional power plant, a small storage unit and a large storage 
unit in a stylized example. 
7 Assuming an empty storage in t0, the share can easily be computed as Δt* =
t*2 − t1 = ηstor(t2 − t1). Alternatively, it would be possible to discharge at lower 
capacity throughout the period t1,…, t2. Since the prices are assumed constant 
during t1,…, t2, this storage operation would lead to the exact same profit. 
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exemplary technologies and their respective difference costs Cdiff are 
presented, namely a conventional power plant (e.g., an open-cycle gas 
turbine), a small storage unit (e.g., a lithium-ion battery) and a large 
storage unit (e.g., an electric thermal storage8). Please note that the 
stylized example assumes a situation in the future, where storage tech-
nologies have reached cost-competitiveness with conventional power 
plants. 
In this setting, the conventional power plant has constant difference 
costs since it is not affected by the required storage duration. Contrary, 
the capacity of the small storage unit is already derated under relatively 
low storage duration requirements due to its limited storage volume. 
Increasing the storage duration requirements comes along with stronger 
derating, ultimately resulting in a constant linear increase of the dif-
ference costs. Due to its larger storage volume and consequently longer 
achievable discharge duration tdischarge = t′ , the difference costs of the 
large storage unit remain constant for storage duration requirements of 
trequired ≤ t′ . Yet, for higher storage duration requirements, also the ca-
pacity of this technology is derated leading to a constant linear increase 
of its difference costs. 
As a result, two tipping points regarding the lowest-cost technology 
to provide the required (equivalent) capacity can be observed in this 
specific setting (solid red line in Fig. 2). For storage duration re-
quirements of trequired ≤ t*, the small storage unit is the best of the three 
available options. Increasing the requirements to t* < trequired ≤ t**, the 
large storage unit becomes preferable. Finally, under even higher re-
quirements of trequired > t**, the conventional power plant is the cheapest 
option, since it is the only technology not affected by derating factors. 
Apart from the described impact on technology choice, the choice of 
the derating factors also has another somewhat inverse effect. Since the 
total amount of firm capacity to be procured in the capacity auctions is 
typically predefined, stronger derating of storage technologies leads to a 
lower capacity contribution of these units and therefore a higher amount 
of nameplate capacity to be contracted in order to fulfill the desired firm 
capacity target. Thus, depending on the relation of the different tech-
nologies’ difference costs, stronger derating of storages may indeed even 
lead to more storage investments being carried out despite the higher 
capacity prices bid into the auction. In the stylized example, the highest 
amount of small storage investments could therefore be expected for 
storage duration requirements marginally below t*, and analogously for 
large storages at requirements marginally below t**. Please note that this 
effect only occurs as long as the capacity demand is fixed and not price 
sensitive. In many US markets (PJM, ISO-NE, NYISO9) this is not the case 
as they apply downward-sloping capacity demand curves in their auc-
tions (Byers et al., 2018). 
4. Simulation study 
In order to verify our theoretical findings regarding the impact of 
CRM design parameters on the competitiveness of storage, we now apply 
a multi-country long-term electricity market model to investigate these 
parameters in realistic and complex real-world settings. For this pur-
pose, we first provide a brief introduction to the applied model (Section 
4.1) and the necessary input data (Section 4.2). We then present de-
velopments under a European EOM, which serves as a benchmark 
(Section 4.3). Subsequently, we set up a number of additional simula-
tions illustrating the impact of implementing capacity auctions with call 
options (Section 4.4) as well as different storage derating factors in these 
auctions (Section 4.5) on investments in storage units. 
Please note that the applied model has an explorative rather than a 
normative character. Thus, by simulating system behavior that emerges 
from individual actors’ decisions, we want to analyze which technolo-
gies would be successful in the capacity auctions and receive support to 
come into the market under a specific setting. In contrast, we explicitly 
do not investigate which technologies should be supported to achieve a 
certain goal targeted by the regulator. 
4.1. Model overview and relevant extensions 
PowerACE is an established agent-based simulation model developed 
for the analysis of European electricity markets in long-term scenario 
analyses. The initial model version is documented in Genoese (2010). 
Other previous applications of the model in different configurations 
include Bublitz et al. (2017), Keles et al. (2016) and Ringler et al. (2017). 
The model runs at hourly resolution (8760 h/a) over a typical time 
horizon from 2015 up to 2050. PowerACE covers different market seg-
ments with a focus on the day-ahead market and different types of 
CRMs. 
As shown in Fig. 3, various agents represent the associated market 
participants, such as utility companies, regulators and consumers. The 
electricity suppliers can decide on the daily scheduling of their con-
ventional power plants and storage units (see Appendix A.1) as well as 
on the construction of new conventional generation or storage capacities 
based on expected future profits (see Appendix A.2 and A.3). Thus, the 
short-term and long-term decision levels are jointly considered and their 
interactions can be investigated. Ultimately, the development of the 
markets emerges from the simulated behavior of all agents. A model 
validation is provided in Ringler et al. (2017). 
PowerACE has been substantially extended for the analyses of this 
paper. Firstly, a bidding algorithm for the participation of storage units 
in the day-ahead market has been developed, which is described in 
detail in Fraunholz et al. (2017). Secondly, the existing investment 
planning procedure has been modified from a national perspective to 
a cross-border perspective and storage technologies have been 
included as additional investment candidates (for details, see Fraunholz 
et al., 2019). Thirdly, storage technologies have been integrated in the 
modeled CRMs. For this purpose, in particular the two new parameters 
price cap and required storage duration were implemented. Please note 
that the described consideration of storage technologies in all relevant 
parts of PowerACE is challenging, as it adds a time-coupled component 
to the model. 
4.2. Data and assumptions 
Due to its nature as a detailed bottom-up simulation model, Power-
ACE requires substantial amounts of input data. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the data used in all simulations presented in the following as 
well as the respective sources. Please refer to Appendix B for details on 
the techno-economic characteristics of the different investment options 
as well as fuel and carbon prices. In the following paragraphs, additional 
assumptions are briefly described. 
In order to adequately capture the variety of different electricity 
market designs in Europe, the regional scope of the applied version of 
PowerACE covers several European countries. We first run a benchmark 
simulation with a European EOM, which is then contrasted with several 
different configurations of national CRM policies, i.e., each of the ten 
countries is modeled under consideration of its current real-world 
market design10 (see Fig. 4). Please refer to Table 3 for an overview of 8 We base the characteristics of this technology on the concept presented by 
Siemens Gamesa (2019), which consists of a resistive heater for the charging 
process, volcanic stones as storage medium and a water steam cycle for the 
discharging process. Due to the large share of low-cost off the shelf components, 
we expect this technology to soon become one of the most cost-efficient 
large-scale electricity storage technologies available.  
9 New York Independent System Operator. 
10 For details on the different market designs see Bublitz et al. (2019). Due to 
the similarities of the different types of CRMs on an abstract level, the French 
mechanism is modeled using the central buyer implementation, although in 
reality, a de-central obligation mechanism is used in France. 
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the scenarios investigated with PowerACE in the following sections. 
All simulations are carried out at an hourly resolution and cover the 
time horizon from 2020 to 2050. Please note that as the focus of this 
paper is on market design issues, we do not model the electrical grid in 
detail, but only consider limited cross-border transmission capacities, 
while intra-zonal restrictions are not accounted for. This corresponds to 
the concept of zonal pricing which is used for the real-world market 
clearing process in Europe. 
Contrary to the model endogenous expansion planning, decom-
missioning of existing power plants is exogenously defined based on the 
respective age and technical lifetime of the generation units, which 
remain unchanged for all scenarios under investigation. For two exem-
plary countries, France and Italy, the remaining capacities until 2050 
without additional investments are shown on a technology aggregated 
level in Fig. 5. As a reference, the peak residual demand11 is also shown. 
The developments of electricity generation from renewables and 
electricity demand are an exogenous input to PowerACE, which remains 
unchanged for all scenarios. Additional model endogenous investments 
in renewable technologies are therefore not considered. Moreover, DSM 
Fig. 3. Schematic overview of the electricity market model PowerACE. The focus lies on the short-term simulation of the day-ahead markets and long-term in-
vestment decisions under consideration of different capacity remuneration mechanisms as well as cross-border effects. 
Table 2 
Overview of the input data used in all simulations carried out with PowerACE.  
Input data type Resolution Sources and comments 
Conventional 
power plants 
unit level S&P Global Platts (2015), and own 
assumptions 
Fuel prices yearly EU Reference Scenario (de Vita et al., 2016), 
and own assumptions (cf. Fig. 11) 
Carbon prices yearly EU Reference Scenario (de Vita et al., 2016), 
scaled to reach 150 EUR/tCO2 in 2050 (cf.  
Fig. 11) 
Investment options yearly Louwen et al. (2018); Schröder et al. 
(2013); Siemens Gamesa (2019), and own 
assumptions (cf. Tables 8 and 9) 
Transmission 
capacities 
yearly Ten-Year Network Development Plan ( 
ENTSO-E, 2016) 
Electricity demand hourly, 
market area 
historical time series of 2015 (ENTSO-E, 
2017), scaled to the yearly demand given in 
the EU Reference Scenario (de Vita et al., 
2016) 
Renewable feed-in hourly, 
market area 
historical time series of 2015 (ENTSO-E, 
2017), scaled to reach an overall renewable 
share in relation to electricity demand of 
80% in 2050  
11 The peak residual demand is defined as the highest hourly electricity de-
mand of the respective market area, which is not covered by renewable 
generation. 
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is out of the scope of this paper and not taken into account, i.e., the 
electricity demand is completely static. Fig. 6 illustrates the assumed 
composition of the renewable electricity generation in France and Italy 
as well as the total yearly electricity demand. 
4.3. Reference developments under a European energy-only market 
As a benchmark for the subsequent analyses on CRM design pa-
rameters in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we now present the simulated long- 
term developments under a European EOM. For this purpose, Figs. 7 
and 8 depict the conventional power plant and utility-scale storage ca-
pacities in France and Italy from 2020 to 2050. We choose these two 
countries for further analysis, since they have implemented a CRM in the 
current real-world setting and face substantial increases in future 
renewable electricity generation, therefore rendering storage in-
vestments attractive. The capacity developments emerge from exoge-
nously given decommissioning of power plants (cf. Fig. 5) and 
endogenous investment decisions of the different agents in PowerACE.12 
In France, the first thing to notice is the sharp (exogenously given) 
decline of nuclear generation capacities within a rather short period of 
time (47 GW between 2028 and 2038). Consequently, we can observe 
substantial amounts of substitute investments, mainly in combined cycle 
(CCGT) and open cycle gas turbines (OCGT). Since these technologies 
have a typical lifetime of 30 years (cf. Table 8), once installed, they 
remain in the market until the end of the simulation period in 2050. As a 
result, only relatively few additional investments in storage technologies 
are carried out starting in 2040. This lock-in effect illustrates the high 
path dependence of the future technology mix. By using a dynamic 
multi-period model, we are able to properly take these effects into ac-
count. Ultimately, in 2050, we end up with 13.2 GW of new storages. 
Together with the 4.7 GW of pumped storage units, the total storage 
capacity in France makes up for some 24% of the total flexible, i.e., 
conventional plus storage, capacity installed. 
In Italy, the picture is somewhat different than in France. Due to the huge 
initial overcapacities, new investments are only carried out starting in 2037, 
i.e., 10 years later than in France. By this time, investment expenses for 
storage technologies have already strongly declined as compared to today 
(cf. Table 9). In combination with the growing shares of renewable electricity 
generation towards 2050, this setting leads to some new conventional power 
plants, but also substantial investments in additional storage units. In 2050, a 
total of 23.4 GW of new storages is installed. Together with the 6.4 GW of 
pumped storage units, the total storage capacity in Italy makes up for some 
56% of the total flexible capacity installed. This share is substantially higher 
than in France, which will be a highly relevant finding for the subsequent 
analyses on CRM design parameters. 
4.4. Capacity auctions bundled with call options 
4.4.1. Scenario setup 
Let us now move on to the introduction of national CRM policies (cf. 
Fig. 4) and more specifically the impact of bundling the capacity auc-
tions with call options, which includes setting an additional day-ahead 
price limit for the capacity contracted in the capacity auctions. For 
this purpose, we set up three additional scenarios which we then 
compare with the European EOM scenario. An overview of the investi-
gated scenarios is provided in Table 4. All variables and parameters not 
mentioned there remain unchanged in all scenarios under investigation. 
In scenario CRM-08, no strike price is set, i.e., only the general day- 
Fig. 4. Overview of the real-world electricity market designs implemented in 
the different countries covered by PowerACE. 
Table 3 
Overview of all scenarios investigated with PowerACE. In Section 4.3, a benchmark with a European EOM is analyzed. Section 4.4 focuses on the impact of different 
strike price levels in a CRM. Finally, Section 4.5 uses the most favorable strike price level for storages and then investigates varying storage duration requirements in 
more detail.  
Section Electricity market designs Strike price1 Storage duration requirement2 
European EOM National CRM policies n/a none high low n/a low medium high 
4.3 x  x    x    
4.4  x  x x x   x  
4.5  x    x  x x x 
Abbreviations: CRM—capacity remuneration mechanism, EOM—energy-only market. 
1This additional price limit on the day-ahead market only applies to capacity that has been successfully contracted in the capacity auctions and should not be confused 
with the general day-ahead price limit of 3000 EUR/MWhel, which is valid for all participants of the day-ahead market. 
2Storage units with shorter discharge durations than required may still participate in the capacity auctions, but are derated and are only remunerated for a certain share 
of their maximum discharging capacity. 
12 Please note that Figs. 7 and 8 do not show the electricity generation but the 
installed capacities, i.e., despite similar capacity levels as compared to today, the 
conventional power plants face significantly lower running hours in the future 
due to the assumed strong increase in renewable electricity generation (cf. 
Fig. 6). 
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Fig. 6. Assumed renewable electricity generation and electricity demand in France (a) and Italy (b). Source: own illustration based on data from ENTSO-E (2017); de 
Vita et al. (2016), and own assumptions. 
Fig. 7. Simulated development of the conventional power plant capacities in France (a) and Italy (b) under a European energy-only market design.  
Fig. 5. Assumed conventional power plant capacities in France (a) and Italy (b) without additional new investments. Source: own illustration based on data from 
S&P Global Platts (2015), and own assumptions. 
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ahead price limit of 3000 EUR/MWhel applies. Contrary, in scenario 
CRM-08-limit_low, we analyze the other extreme case, in which the strike 
price is set equal to cvarCONE,y, i.e., the variable cost of a new entry con-
ventional power plant (typically an OCGT) in the given year y.13 In order 
to limit the interference with the market evolution in normal conditions, 
Vazquez et al. (2002) suggest to set the strike price at least 25% above 
the most expensive generator expected to produce. For this reason, in 
scenario CRM-08-limit_high, we also investigate the case of a higher 
strike price set at 150% of cvarCONE,y. 
In all described CRM scenarios, we assume that the regulator bears 
the risk of a storage unit running empty during a multi-hour scarcity 
period, i.e., the storage operator is not subject to an implicit penalty in 
such situations (see also the discussion in Section 3). Moreover, we set 
the required minimum storage duration to an intermediate value of 8 h 
for all scenarios. The impact of varying this parameter will then be 
analyzed in detail in the following Section 4.5. 
4.4.2. Long-term capacity developments 
For all described scenarios and the two countries under investigation 
(France and Italy), Fig. 9 shows the simulated development of the con-
ventional power plant and utility-scale storage capacities between 2020 
and 2050. Please note that in order to make the differences between the 
scenarios more clearly visible, the respective deltas of installed capac-
ities as compared to the European EOM are illustrated rather than pre-
senting the absolute capacity values. Consequently, the zero-line 
represents the installed capacities in the European EOM. We also inte-
grate a solid black line indicating the sum of the storage capacity deltas 
as well as a dashed black line for the total conventional capacity deltas. 
In France, we can observe that without implementing a strike price, 
the introduction of the French CRM mainly incentivizes more in-
vestments in gas-fired power plants (both CCGTs and OCGTs) as 
compared to the European EOM (Fig. 9, top left), while the total 
installed storage capacity remains relatively stable. It becomes obvious 
though, that storage investments are shifted to a later period, since the 
additional conventional power plants reduce their profitability. Results 
for Italy show similar trends (Fig. 9, top right). 
If a high strike price at 150% of cvarCONE,y is implemented, somewhat 
more storage capacity is built in France as compared to both the situa-
tion under a European EOM and that under a CRM without strike price 
(Fig. 9, middle left). Contrary, in Italy, no such trend can be clearly 
identified (Fig. 9, middle right). We will come back to the reasons for 
this finding later. 
Finally, under a low strike price at cvarCONE,y, substantially more stor-
ages are built in France than in any other setting investigated thus far 
(Fig. 9, bottom left). Moreover, the investments in storages are also 
carried out a lot earlier, starting already in 2030 rather than only after 
2040. The higher installed storage capacities in turn replace some later 
investments in OCGTs due to the lock-in effect. In Italy, the trend of 
building storages earlier than in the other settings is similar, yet does not 
lead to a stable higher amount of installed storages in the long run 
(Fig. 9, bottom right). 
Summing up, we can conclude, that the findings of the simulations 
carried out generally stand in line with our theoretical discussion on the 
impact of implementing call options with a certain strike price in Section 
Table 4 
Overview of the investigated scenarios regarding capacity remuneration mechanisms with call options and different strike prices.  
Scenario Electricity market designs Strike price1 Storage duration requirement2 
EOM European EOM n/a n/a 
CRM-08 National CRM policies none 8 h 
CRM-08-limit_high National CRM policies 1.5⋅cvarCONE,y  8 h 
CRM-08-limit_low National CRM policies cvarCONE,y  8 h 
Abbreviations: CONE—cost of new entry, CRM—capacity remuneration mechanism, EOM—energy-only market. 
1This additional price limit on the day-ahead market only applies to capacity that has been successfully contracted in the capacity auctions and should not be confused 
with the general day-ahead price limit of 3000 EUR/MWhel, which is valid for all participants of the day-ahead market. 
2 Storage units with shorter discharge durations than required may still participate in the capacity auctions, but are derated and are only remunerated for a certain 
share of their maximum discharging capacity. 
Fig. 8. Simulated development of the utility-scale storage capacities in France (a) and Italy (b) under a European energy-only market design.  
13 This stands in line with the way the strike price is determined in the 
recently implemented Italian CRM (Mastropietro et al., 2018; Perico et al., 
2018). The Irish CRM also applies a similar methodology, in which the strike 
price is set a the maximum of two values: firstly, the fuel costs of a hypothetical 
reference peak generation unit and secondly, the variable costs of a reference 
demand side unit. This procedure is chosen to avoid discrimination against 
demand side management, which might face higher variable costs then a gen-
eration unit. Thus, under the Irish approach, typically a higher strike price than 
in Italy would evolve. For details please refer to Single Electricity Market 
Committee (2015). 
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3.2. We can therefore confirm that if a CRM without call options is 
implemented, an implicit bias towards conventional power plants exists, 
while a CRM with call options and a strike price increases storage 
profitability in direct comparison with conventional power plants. 
However, the effect in the simulations is much more pronounced in 
France than in Italy. This can largely be attributed to differences in the 
structure of the initial power plant fleets. As shown in Fig. 5 and pre-
viously discussed in Section 4.3, exogenously defined decommissioning 
of power plants starts earlier and at a much sharper rate in France than 
in Italy. The dominating driver for storage investments in Italy are the 
achievable arbitrage profits due to low investment expenses for storages 
in the period beyond 2040. Consequently, both the introduction of the 
Italian CRM and the optional bundling with call options have a rather 
small impact. In France, however, due to the stronger decommissioning 
rate, investments are needed earlier, when storages are still rather 
expensive to build. In this particular situation, implementing a CRM 
bundled with call options can shift investments towards storage 
technologies. 
It is also important to mention that in none of the analyzed settings 
does the implementation of a strike price lead to all conventional power 
plant investments being replaced by storage units. This is because a 
strike price only affects the technology choice in situations where high 
price periods follow low price periods (as in our stylized example pre-
sented in Section 3.2). If this situation is not given and storages are not 
able to charge at low or even zero cost, conventional power plants may 
remain the more profitable option to build, even if a strike price is 
implemented. 
Our simulation results suggest that no straightforward answer can be 
given on whether an EOM or a CRM is more favorable for investments in 
storage technologies, but much depends on the country-specific drivers 
as well as the concrete design of the CRM. A CRM without call options 
has a rather small impact on storage investments as compared to an 
EOM, since lower revenues on the energy markets are compensated by 
the additional capacity remuneration. If call options with a strike price 
Fig. 9. Simulated development of the conventional power plant and utility-scale storage capacities in France (left) and Italy (right) under capacity remuneration 
mechanisms with different strike prices (from top to bottom: none, high, low). The values shown are the respective deltas of installed capacities as compared to the 
European energy-only market design. 
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are implemented, storage units gain a competitive advantage over 
conventional power plants in the capacity auctions. The additional ca-
pacity remuneration then leads to more storage investments as 
compared to an EOM. This effect is particularly important in countries 
with high capacity needs in the medium-term (2030–2040), where 
storage technologies are still rather expensive to build. 
4.4.3. Impact on generation adequacy 
An essential aspect when analyzing storage participation in CRMs is 
their ability to provide firm capacity. Although the model we apply for 
our simulations is deterministic, we can still draw some general con-
clusions on this issue by comparing the market outcomes in the different 
scenarios. For this purpose, Table 5 shows two relevant adequacy in-
dicators for all scenarios investigated thus far. Firstly, we present the 
mean amount of yearly hours with no successful market clearing, i.e., 
the situations in which the available generation and storage capacity 
plus potential imports were not sufficient to cover the residual demand. 
Secondly, we show the respective average yearly amounts of energy not 
served in these scarcity situations. 
In France, for both indicators we can clearly identify that in all CRM 
scenarios, generation adequacy is substantially higher than in the Eu-
ropean EOM. This is a rather straightforward finding since capacity 
targets in France are implemented in these settings. We do observe, 
however, that scarcity situations only fully vanish, if no strike price is 
implemented and consequently comparably few storages are built. 
Apparently, some scarcity situations with longer durations exist, in 
which the required storage duration of 8 h is not sufficient. Since the 
introduction of a strike price has a rather small impact on the technology 
composition in Italy as described before, we can also see from Table 5 
that the adequacy increases similarly in all CRM settings as compared to 
the European EOM. However, also in Italy some scarcity situations 
remain due to insufficiently large storage volumes. 
In order to tackle the issue of storages running empty during scarcity 
periods, it is important to account for the energy-limited nature of 
storages in the capacity auctions. One way of doing so is to define a 
minimum discharge duration requirement and derate storage capacity 
accordingly, if a technology is not able to fulfill these requirements. The 
following section discusses this topic in more detail. 
4.5. Storage derating in the capacity auctions 
4.5.1. Scenario setup 
We now stay with the CRM design determined as the most favorable 
one for storage investments, i.e., the setting with a low strike price set at 
cvarCONE,y. In order to investigate the impact of different storage derating 
factors, we re-use scenario CRM-08-limit_low from the previous section 
with a storage duration requirement of 8 h and run two additional 
simulations: CRM-04-limit_low, with a reduced requirement of 4 h and 
CRM-12-limit_low, with an increased requirement of 12 h.14 These three 
scenarios are again all contrasted with the benchmark of a European 
EOM. Table 6 summarizes all scenarios and their respective character-
istics. All variables and parameters not mentioned there remain un-
changed in all scenarios under investigation. 
In our model, regardless of the storage duration requirements, all 
storage technologies are allowed to participate in the capacity auctions, 
yet their contracted capacity is derated according to Eq. (10) if their 
storage volume is not sufficient to fulfill the requirements.15 
4.5.2. Long-term capacity developments 
Fig. 10 presents the simulated development of the conventional 
power plant and utility-scale storage capacities between 2020 and 2050 
for all described scenarios and the two countries under investigation 
(France and Italy). As in the previous analysis focusing on call options, 
we illustrate the respective deltas of installed capacities as compared to 
the European EOM to emphasize the differences between the scenarios. 
In both France and Italy similar trends can be observed. If we 
compare the settings with 4 h (Fig. 10, top) and 8 h (Fig. 10, middle) 
storage duration requirements, we can see a shift of investments from 
small li-ion batteries with 4 h discharge duration towards electric 
thermal storages8 with 10 h discharge duration. The latter technology 
becomes the preferred option, as it is less affected by strong storage 
derating due to its larger storage volume. At the same time, the stronger 
derating of storages also leads to higher amounts of nameplate capacity 
to be contracted in the capacity auctions to fulfill the required firm ca-
pacity targets set by the regulator. This in turn leads to substantial 
amounts of additional gas-fired power plants (mostly CCGTs), but also to 
temporary phases with more storage investments carried out despite the 
stronger derating factor (see also Section 3.3). 
Table 6 
Overview of the investigated scenarios regarding capacity remuneration mechanisms with different storage duration requirements.  
Scenario Electricity market designs Strike price1 Storage duration requirement2 
EOM European EOM n/a n/a 
CRM-04-limit_low National CRM policies cvarCONE,y  4 h 
CRM-08-limit_low National CRM policies cvarCONE,y  8 h 
CRM-12-limit_low National CRM policies cvarCONE,y  12 h 
Abbreviations: CONE—cost of new entry, CRM—capacity remuneration mechanism, EOM—energy-only market. 
1This additional price limit on the day-ahead market only applies to capacity that has been successfully contracted in the capacity auctions and should not be confused 
with the general day-ahead price limit of 3000 EUR/MWhel, which is valid for all participants of the day-ahead market. 
2Storage units with shorter discharge durations than required may still participate in the capacity auctions, but are derated and are only remunerated for a certain share 
of their maximum discharging capacity. 
Table 5 
Generation adequacy indicators in France and Italy under a European energy- 
only market and capacity remuneration mechanisms with different strike prices.  
Scenario No market clearing Energy not served 
[⌀ 2020–2050 in h/a]  [⌀ 2020–2050 in GWh/a]  
France Italy France Italy 
EOM 10.7 8.4 60.5 50.0 
CRM-08 – 1.4 – 1.7 
CRM-08-limit_high 1.6 1.8 3.7 2.7 
CRM-08-limit_low 5.1 2.1 16.2 2.6  
14 The range of 4–12 h for the storage duration requirement is chosen ac-
cording to the properties of the implemented storage investment options (see 
Table 9). Moreover, for the CRM implemented in the UK a requirement of 4 h 
has recently been defined with derating applied for smaller storage discharge 
durations (National Grid, 2017).  
15 While this procedure is similar to the CRMs in Ireland and the UK, our 
approach of using linear derating is somewhat simplified as compared to the 
more advanced methods used in the real-world cases (National Grid, 2017; 
Single Electricity Market Committee, 2016). 
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Moving on to the storage duration requirement of 12 h (Fig. 10, 
bottom), we can see that storage technologies are becoming a lot less 
competitive than in the other settings. Consequently, fewer storage in-
vestments are carried out and those that remain are built at a later phase 
of the simulated period. In this setting, the higher amounts of nameplate 
capacity to be contracted in the capacity auctions lead to a strong 
increase in CCGTs and OCGTs, but no additional storage investments. 
These simulation results stand perfectly in line with what we would 
expect from out theoretical discussion of the impact of storage derating 
in Section 3.3. We can therefore confirm that stronger derating of stor-
age technologies generally creates a bias towards larger storages and 
ultimately conventional power plants. However, we also find that the 
higher amounts of nameplate capacity to be procured in the capacity 
auctions may in some settings overcompensate this effect and even lead 
to more storage investments despite stronger derating. 
Regarding the question whether an EOM or a CRM is more favorable 
for investments in storage technologies, we can confirm our findings 
from the previous section: While no straightforward answer to this issue 
can be given, it is rather the concrete design of the CRM that matters. 
The choice of the derating factors for storages is a strong driver deciding 
on whether more or less storage units are built than under a European 
EOM, and also which storage technology will be the dominant one. 
Moderate storage duration requirements are generally favorable for 
investments in small storages and may consequently lead to additional 
storage capacity under a CRM as compared to a European EOM. Higher 
storage duration requirements, i.e., stronger derating of storage 
Fig. 10. Simulated development of the conventional power plant and utility-scale storage capacities in France (left) and Italy (right) under capacity remuneration 
mechanisms with different storage duration requirements (from top to bottom: 4 h, 8 h, 12 h). The values shown are the respective deltas of installed capacities as 
compared to the European energy-only market design. 
Table 7 
Generation adequacy indicators in France and Italy under a European energy- 
only market and capacity remuneration mechanisms with different storage 
duration requirements.  
Scenario No market clearing Energy not served 
[⌀ 2020–2050 in h/a]  [⌀ 2020–2050 in GWh/a]  
France Italy France Italy 
EOM 10.7 8.4 60.5 50.0 
CRM-04-limit_low 11.6 4.0 57.0 11.3 
CRM-08-limit_low 5.1 2.1 16.2 2.6 
CRM-12-limit_low 0.2 – 0.1 –  
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capacity, makes small storages less attractive and shifts the technology 
mix towards larger storages or even conventional power plants. At the 
same time, stronger derating leads to higher nameplate capacity targets 
in the capacity auctions, which are then typically reached through 
additional large storage units or ultimately conventional power plants. 
4.5.3. Impact on generation adequacy 
As previously discussed, the choice of the storage derating factors 
does not only affect the future technology mix, but in consequence also 
the ability of a CRM to fulfill its major objective of ensuring long-term 
generation adequacy. In order to get insights on this issue, Table 7 
presents the same two adequacy indicators as in the previous analysis of 
call options with varying strike prices. 
In both France and Italy, we can see similar trends for the two in-
dicators. Moderate storage derating leads to relatively high shares of 
storage units. Due to their limited storage volume, these units are not 
able to provide sufficient firm capacity to cover all peak demand periods. 
Consequently, scarcity situations can only be partly reduced (Italy) or 
even stay at a similar level as under a European EOM (France). This of 
course contradicts the actual goal of implementing a CRM in the first 
place. 
If stronger storage derating factors are applied, fewer storage in-
vestments, but substantially more investments in conventional power 
plants are carried out. Since the conventional units are able to provide 
firm capacity at all times (neglecting forced outages), the scarcity situ-
ations vanish completely in this setting (Italy) or are at least reduced to a 
much lower level than in the European EOM setting (France). We can 
ultimately conclude that the appropriate choice of the storage derating 
factors in capacity auctions is essential in order to guarantee generation 
adequacy. At the same time, the resulting technology mix may be 
strongly affected by this design parameter. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
Both the theoretical discussion and the simulations carried out 
showed that there is no straightforward answer to whether an EOM or a 
CRM is the more beneficial market design for electricity storage tech-
nologies. Rather than the actual market design, much depends on the 
concrete specification of the CRM, which always creates a certain bias 
towards one technology or the other. We were able to show that 
bundling capacity auctions with call options and the choice of the 
storage derating factor are important drivers in this regard. 
If storage units are not penalized for non-availability during scarcity 
situations caused by their storage volume running empty, they likely 
benefit from the introduction of call options with a certain strike price in 
direct comparison with conventional power plants. Contrary, if the 
storage units are indeed penalized even in these particular situations or 
if no call options with strike price are used, there exists a bias towards 
conventional power plants, as they do not face the risk of a storage 
running empty and can always provide firm capacity (neglecting forced 
outages). 
We were also able to show that it is crucial to adequately estimate the 
firm capacity a storage unit can provide and to derive storage derating 
factors accordingly. Otherwise, the contribution of small storages may 
be overestimated, leading to issues regarding generation adequacy 
despite the implementation of a CRM. 
At least to some extent, these results are also valid for DSM, which, 
much like electricity storage, is an energy-limited resource. However, 
each DSM technology differs regarding the underlying process, such that 
very individual restrictions need to be considered. Therefore a direct and 
general transfer of our results for electricity storage is not possible. 
Overall, we can conclude, that the actual design of a CRM substan-
tially impacts the future technology mix, even if all technologies are 
formally allowed to participate in the mechanism. The specification of 
the CRM may then in turn also have an impact on the goal of achieving 
long-term generation adequacy. More specifically, we could observe 
that electricity storage does indeed have a capacity value and should 
therefore be allowed to participate in any CRM, yet with its nameplate 
capacity adequately derated to reflect the firm capacity it can actually 
provide. Moreover, the simulation results suggest, that substantial need 
for investment in generation and storage capacity exists in Europe in the 
upcoming years due to decommissioning of old units. 
Policymakers and regulators are therefore strongly recommended to 
design or re-specify their CRMs accordingly to allow for storage 
participation in an adequate manner. In this regard, the time to act is 
now. Otherwise, a lock-in effect may occur, i.e., once an undesired 
technology is built, it will likely remain in the system for a long time. 
While some European CRMs, e.g., Ireland and the United Kingdom, are 
already on the right path and have recently developed methods to 
determine storage derating factors, barriers are still very high in US 
markets like PJM, due to unnecessarily strict requirements (Chen et al., 
2017; National Grid, 2017; Single Electricity Market Committee, 2016, 
2018; Usera et al., 2017). Moreover, Ireland and Italy also combine their 
capacity auctions with call options and a certain strike price, which is 
generally favorable for storage units. 
We are well aware that real-world CRMs are much more complicated 
than the simplified settings we have analyzed in our work and more 
research therefore needs to be carried out to confirm our findings. In 
particular, we refrain from modeling strategic behavior in the capacity 
auctions. To gain insights into this issue, it may be interesting to delve 
into the design and the auction outcomes of the different CRMs imple-
mented around the world. 
Moreover, in the simulations carried out, the storage derating factor 
has been determined by exogenously setting arbitrary required 
discharge durations rather than trying to choose optimal such values. It 
could therefore be a promising approach, to have the regulator agent 
determine adequate derating factors endogenously by implementing one 
of the methods from the literature (Borozan et al., 2019; Sioshansi et al., 
2014; Zhou et al., 2015, 2016) into the simulation framework. 
So far, we have focused on conventional power plants and short-term 
storage units. We could also extend our work by considering additional 
technologies like seasonal storage (power-to-X) or DSM to see whether 
the findings for short-term electricity storage also hold for these tech-
nologies. However, due to the large storage volume of power-to-X 
technologies, we expect its diffusion to mostly depend on the achiev-
able reductions in capital expenditures rather than on the specific CRM 
design. As regards DSM, the issue lies mostly with the availability of the 
necessary process-specific data. 
Finally, we have to mention that electricity storage has many addi-
tional benefits to just the provision of firm capacity and arbitrage trading 
as we assume it in our paper. As we neglect this aspect, we probably 
underestimate the storage diffusion potential as compared to a real- 
world setting with multiple revenue streams. However, this does not 
diminish the relevance of our results. 
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Appendix A. PowerACE model description 
A.1. Day-ahead market simulation 
PowerACE is structured into different market areas, in each of which multiple traders are active on the day-ahead market. All agents participating 
in the market first create a price forecast, for which the behavior of the other market participants is anticipated, and then prepare individual hourly 
demand and supply bids. 
The bid prices for the supply bids are primarily based on the variable costs of the respective power plant. In addition, the price forecast is used to 
estimate the running hours of each power plant and to distribute the expected start-up costs accordingly. Further price-inelastic bids for demand, 
renewable feed-in and storage units are prepared by a single trader per market area, respectively. For details on the determination of the bid volumes 
for the storage units, please refer to Fraunholz et al. (2017). 
Once all bids have been prepared, they are submitted to the central market coupling operator. In the market clearing process, supply and demand 
bids are matched across all market areas, such that welfare is maximized subject to the limited interconnector capacities between the different market 
areas. For a formal description and details of the market coupling and clearing see Ringler et al. (2017). 
As a result, the information about which bids have been partly or fully accepted is returned to the different traders. Final outcome of the day-ahead 
market simulation is a market clearing price and corresponding electricity volume for each simulation hour and market area. Please note that situ-
ations may occur, in which the available generation and storage capacity plus potential imports are not sufficient to cover the residual demand. The 
market clearing price in the respective market area is then set at the day-ahead price limit of 3000 EUR/MWhel. 
A.2. Generation and storage expansion planning 
In addition to the short-term decisions on the day-ahead market, the different utility companies modeled as agents in PowerACE can also perform 
long-term decisions on investments in new conventional power plant and storage capacities at the end of each simulation year. Contrary to the 
common approach of generation expansion planning with the objective of minimizing total future system costs, an actor’s perspective is taken. 
Consequently, investments are only carried out if expected to be profitable by the investor agents. The expansion planning algorithm is introduced and 
described in detail in Fraunholz et al. (2019). A brief overview of the basic principles is given in the following. 
In order to estimate the profitability of the different investment options, a model-endogenous long-term price forecast is first carried out. Using this 
forecast, annual contribution margins for all technologies are calculated and corresponding net present values are derived. These are ultimately 
converted to annuities to account for technology specific investment horizons. 
For conventional power plant technologies, the contribution margins are calculated in a simplified fashion as the sum of call options on the 
respective hourly contribution margins. For storage technologies, the contribution margins correspond to their maximum arbitrage potential. Thus, in 
order to determine optimal hourly charging and discharging strategies based on the expected future prices, a time-coupled linear optimization 
problem is solved. 
As previously mentioned in Appendix A.1, scarcity situations may occur in the model, if the available generation and storage capacities are not 
sufficient to cover the residual demand. The anticipation of the corresponding peak prices up to the day-ahead price limit of 3000 EUR/MWhel is an 
important driver for investment decisions, both in our model and the theoretical concept of the energy-only market. 
The decisions of the different investors are primarily based on their expectations regarding future electricity prices. As these, vice versa, are 
influenced by the investment decisions of all investors in all interconnected market areas, a complex game with multiple possible strategies opens up. 
To find a stable outcome for this game, a Nash-equilibrium needs to be determined. 
Therefore, the expansion planning algorithm terminates when all planned investments are profitable and at the same time none of the investors is 
able to improve his expected payoff by carrying out further or less investments, i.e., there is no incentive for any investor to unilaterally deviate from 
the equilibrium outcome. The different market areas are defined as the players interacting with each other and the planned investments are then 
distributed among the investors within each market area. Following this approach, it is possible to consider the mutual impact of investments in one 
market area on the electricity prices and consequently investments in the interconnected market areas. 
A.3. Capacity remuneration mechanism 
The following paragraphs briefly introduce the central buyer mechanism implemented in PowerACE, which follows closely the generic mechanism 
introduced in Section 3.1. For further details, please refer to Keles et al. (2016). 
In the market areas with an active central buyer mechanism, annual descending clock auctions are carried out in order to contract a specific 
amount of firm generation and storage capacity. The auctions take place prior to the regular expansion planning as described above. Following this 
approach, it is possible to adequately consider the cross-border impacts of the capacity auctions.16 
16 If the capacity auctions were carried out after the regular expansion planning, the investors in the other market areas could only react to the auction results in the 
subsequent investment planning periods. However, since capacity auctions are typically carried out with a certain lead time, it seems more plausible to assume that 
all investors possess a priori knowledge about the auction results before deciding on their investments. Please note that also in market areas with an active central 
buyer mechanism, additional investments driven by expected revenues from the EOM are always possible. Consequently, all modeled countries are considered in the 
regular expansion planning algorithm. 
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For the auctions, the regulator first sets a targeted ratio between firm capacity and peak residual demand in the respective year, excluding imports. 
This ratio is an arbitrary value, which controls the desired level of generation adequacy and defines the amount of firm capacity to be procured in the 
auction. Since we only analyze deterministic cases in our simulations, we set the targeted ratio to 1.0, such that the residual load in the respective 
market area can always be covered by the domestically available conventional generation and storage capacity, without depending on electricity 
imports. Moreover, in order to analyze the impact of different mechanism designs, we have integrated the two parameters price cap and required storage 
duration as introduced in Section 3.1 into the modeled mechanism. 
Next, the different utility companies provide capacity bids consisting of volume and price. While existing capacity is offered at zero cost,17 the bids 
for potential new power plant and storage capacity are based on the respective difference costs. These are directly related to the regular investment 
planning procedure. Investments expected to be profitable even without additional capacity payments bid into the auction at zero cost. If the desired 
firm capacity is not yet guaranteed through these investments, additional bids of the technology with the lowest negative annuity, i.e. the best, yet not 
profitable investment option, are placed into the auction. The bid price of these additional investments is determined based on the additional income 
that would be needed to recover all cost related to the respective investment, the so-called difference costs. 
For this contribution, storage technologies were integrated into the existing mechanism by using the concept of firm capacity. Thus, while con-
ventional power plants can bid their full nameplate capacity in the auctions, storage units are derated according to the new mechanism design 
parameter required storage duration and can only bid their resulting firm capacity. 
After receiving bids from all market participants, the auction is cleared and all successful participants are compensated with a uniform capacity 
price, which is paid to the existing power plants and storage units for one year and to new constructions for an arbitrary longer period.  
Fig. 11. Assumed development of fuel and carbon prices. Source: own illustration based on data from EU Reference Scenario (de Vita et al., 2016), and own 
assumptions. 
Appendix B. Input data 
Fig. 11 presents the assumed development of fuel and carbon prices over the time horizon of the simulation. 
An overview of the techno-economic characteristics of the different investment options modeled in PowerACE is provided in Tables 8 and 9.  
Table 8 
Conventional power plant investment options modeled in PowerACE with their respective techno-economic characteristics. Source: Schröder et al. (2013); Louwen 
et al. (2018), own assumptions.  
Technology Block size CCS Net efficiency1 Lifetime Building time Specific investment (2015–2050)1 O&M costs fixed O&M costs var2 











Coal 600 No 45–48 40 4 1800 60 6 
30 Yes 36–41 3143–2677 
Lignite 800 No 43–47 40 4 1500 30 7 
Yes 30–33 3840–3324 34 
CCGT 400 No 60–62 30 4 800 20 5 
Yes 49–52 1216–1078 18 
OCGT 400 No 40–42 30 2 400 15 3 
Abbreviations: CCGT—combined cycle gas turbine, CCS—carbon capture and storage, OCGT—open cycle gas turbine, O&M—operation and maintenance. 
1Resulting from technological learning, the net efficiency is assumed to increase over time. Since conventional power plants can generally be regarded as mature 
technologies, it is further assumed that only the specific investments of the CCS-technologies are declining. 
2Including variable costs for carbon capture, transport and storage, where applicable.  
17 In reality, existing capacity not able to operate profitably on the EOM would likely also bid with its respective difference costs. However, since we do not consider 
model endogenous decommissioning of power plant or storage capacity, investment expenses and fixed costs may be considered as sunk costs. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to assume that existing capacity would happily accept any additional capacity remuneration, regardless of how low it may be. 
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Table 9 
Electricity storage investment options modeled in PowerACE with their respective techno-economic characteristics. Source: Louwen et al. (2018); Siemens Gamesa 
(2019), own assumptions.  
Technology Block size Storage capacity1 Round-trip efficiency2 Lifetime2 Building time Specific investment (2015–2050)2 O&M costs fixed2 








Li-ion battery 300 1200 85–95 20–30 2 3149–572 63–11   
3000    7643–1388 153–28 
RF battery 300 3000 75–85 20–30 2 4206–892 84–18 
A-CAES 300 3000 60–75 30 2 1095 22 
ETES 300 1200 50–60 40 2 600 12   
3000    672 13 
Abbreviations: A-CAES—adiabatic compressed air energy storage, ETES—electric thermal energy storage, O&M—operation and maintenance, RF battery—redox-flow 
battery. 
1For RF batteries and A-CAES, a substantial share of the investment expenses is related to the converter units. Consequently, for economic reasons, only higher storage 
capacities of 3000 MWhel are eligible as investment options for these technologies. 
2Resulting from technological learning, round-trip efficiency and lifetime are assumed to increase over time for the emerging storage technologies. Analogously, 
specific investments and fixed costs for O&M are assumed to decline. 
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